The International Atomic Energy Agency is performing safeguards at some nuclear power reactors, 50 bulk processing facilities, and 170 research facilities. Its verification activities require the use of instruments to measure nuclear materials and of surveillance instruments to maintain continuity of knowledge of the locations of nuclear materials. Instruments that are in use and under development to measure weight, volume, concentration, and isotopic composition of nuclear materials, and the major surveillance instruments, will be described in connection with their uses at representative nuclear facilities. The current status of safeguards instrumentation and the needs for future development are discussed.
The United States and the rest of the world have a big stake in the credibility of international safeguards. This paper presents one view of the importance of and the status of instrumentation which The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) probably will need in the next few years. The developers of nuclear instrumentation have provided the devices and the techniques on which these tools are largely based. However, it is important to realize that success or failure of IAEA safeguards depends on many other political and technical factors which would require rather more words to describe than is possible in fifteen minutes. The facilities at this time is to produce more secure and useful seals for the large UF6 cylinders.
Fuel fabrication facilities receive the UF6 cylinders, convert the UF6 to U02 powder, press the powder into pellets, sinter and grind the pellets, stuff them into rods and put 50 to 200 rods into an LWR fuel assembly . In the process some recoverable scrap and disposable wastes are generated. IAEA inspectors visit several times a year to verify the records for receipts, shipments and inventories. Extensive use is made of gamma-ray instruments to verify enrichments of intermediate products, and the U contained in waste discards. Selected samples are sent to the IAEA analytical lab. in Vienna, for more accurate determinations of U-content and enrichment. Until recently, the inspectors had no convenient way to verify the content of finished fuel assemblies, which is important to close a material balance around this plant and for material accounting at reactors and thereafter. Recently, Los Alamos has developed a neutron detector (polyethelene moderator and 3He counters) which will fit around a segment of a fuel assembly. In the passive mode it measures the spontaneous fission neutrons from U-238. With a modest activity isotopic neutron source, it measures the U-235 content with acceptable accuracy. Surveillance instruments are not used at these plants. For Reprocessing plants receive and store spentfuel assemblies, dismantle them, dissolve the fuel, separate the fission products, uranium and plutonium from each other, store U and Pu-nitrate solutions, and transfer them to facilities that convert the nitrates into oxides or other useful forms for subsequent uses. The receiving-storage area involves item accounting and surveillance instrumentation, similar to that at reactor pools. The special problems for the IAEA concern verification of measurements of material entering, contained in, and removed from the chemical processes and the product storage tanks. Inputs and outputs are generally derived from the bulk volume measured in calibrated transfer vessels and on the U and Pu concentrations determined by analysis of representative samples.
The amounts contained in the processing vessels can be estimated, indirectly, with an understanding of the operating characteristics of the individual equipment items, with analysis of samples taken between processes, and using process control information, if these should be available to the Agency. It is important to be able to detect an "abrupt" diversion within a week or two, and also to be as sensitive as possible to longer term diversions. The other important class of research reactor uses natural or low enriched uranium fuel, which is not of great concern, and breeds plutonium more efficiently than the previous class. In this case, the spent fuel should be monitored as it is discharged and while in storage. This activity is similar to that discussed above for LWR spent fuel. 3. It is extremely important to understand how and where the IAEA is or could be using instruments. The Agency will have to collect this information and to provide it to those in friendly nations that will do the engineering.
4. Reliability, tamper-resistance, and the form of data outputs are important. Inspectors have to learn how to use the instruments and how to use the data that they obtain while on inspections. In addition, it may be important to have raw data recorded in such a way that it can be reviewed at a field office and/or in Vienna.
5. The IAEA's budget and resources will always be limited. Ideally, an instrument should save man-hours and also improve safeguards effectiveness. The costs of instruments, capital and up-keep, are important considerations. It is especially important to analyze the costs for repairs, training, calibrations, replacements, etc. that will be involved for each instrument, whether it will be relatively cheap and used in large numbers, or relatively sophisticated and only used at a few special facilities.
6. Clearly there will be a need for close cooperation between the instrument designers and the ultimate users if the resources of both are to be used effectively and so that the IAEA will credibly perform its important safeguards function.
